When examined for the period 1985-1992 as a whole, the impact of changes in the targeted Fed funds rate on U.S. treasury bill rates has been weaker than during previous periods. The period, however, should be viewed as three separate regimes. First, I show significant differences between the Greenspan and Volcker eras arising from management style. Volcker emitted ambiguous signals to the market, which induced "heterogenous" expectations. Greenspan's market leadership forged more homogeneous expectations allowing treasury rate responses prior to the target change to be attributed to market anticipations. Further, I find strong annual seasonality in borrowed reserves targets, corresponding to an agricultural cycle. It suggests the Fed no longer "defends" a target for borrowed reserves and instead allows them to follow the cycle. Subsequently, the Fed funds rate adheres more closely to a target rate and Treasury rates react similarly to an earlier direct Fed funds target regime. Thus, I conclude that as of late 1989, the Fed again directly targets the Fed funds rate.
I. Introduction
Although the empirical support for the expectations theory is deeply contested (see Shiller (1990) and Campbell (1995) for surveys), this leading theory of the term structure retains great intuitive appeal. It is the simple idea that long and short term interest rates should adjust until an investor interested in a relevant time horizon is indifferent between investing in short term bonds rolled over and a long term bond. Bond traders, notably, believe it the rule responsible for the pattern of different maturity treasury securities observed in market trading (Cook and Hahn, 1989) .
Macroeconomists too are very interested in any mechanism relating short-and long-term rates. The short-term interest rate is agreed to be the most important instrument by which monetary policy actions affect the economy. Standard logic also maintains that real investment decisions of private firms are mainly influenced by longer-term rates. The term structure, the difference between long and short-term rates, is then an interesting arena of study as long-term rates do not mechanically follow changes in short term rates. The former, inter-alia, are believed to be strongly influenced by expectations of inflation. It thus seems that the term structure embodies information about the influence of monetary policy on the economy, but the exact mechanism it represents is not yet clearly understood.
Mankiw and Miron (1986) provide a plausible reason for the lack of empirical support for the expectations theory: the central bank fixes a certain level of a very short-term interest rate that is only as predictable as the central bank wants it to be. They provide evidence that the predictive power of contemporaneous longer-term rates on future short-term rates disappears after the Fed was founded.
Specifically, Mankiw and Miron argue that a term premium compensating investors for holding bonds outside the investors' "preferred habitats", the maturities they prefer, fluctuates over time which biases downward the estimated effect on the term structure by the short term rate. Cook and Hahn (1989) examine the effect on the pattern of longer-term rates by a change in the central bank influenced target Fed funds rate. Cook and Hahn (C&H hereafter) find that a change in the Fed target has an approximately equal impact on all daily money market rates but has a diminishing effect on rates of instruments with longer maturities. A Fed tightening then, on average, shifts up the yield curve Trading in options on treasury instruments, for example, began in 1982. 1 2 parallel for short-term rates, with a smaller increase for each longer maturity rate. Since the short-term rates are affected approximately equally by the Fed's policy move, C&H conclude that market participants expect the Fed funds (overnight) rate, the basic rate on the yield curve and the Fed's primary policy tool, to remain at the same level for approximately a year. In the light of the findings of Mankiw and Miron, it means that the term premium fluctuations predominate over this horizon, hiding evidence from standard tests of the expectations theory.
The present study also examines the reaction of treasury securities' rates to changes in the targeted Fed funds rate, but the setting is 1985-1992 which differs in important ways from the time studied by C&H.
One difference concerns the degree of control the Fed desires to have on the Fed funds rate. The late 1970's was a time when the Fed manipulated reserves to hold the Fed funds rate to the targeted Fed funds rate with great accuracy in seeking non-inflationary output growth. 1985-1992 was a much more complicated time, but also more interesting. First, the central bank instituted new operating procedures which include relaxed control over the market Fed funds rate. Market participants, thanks partially to lower transactions costs enabled by financial derivatives , may more actively anticipate Fed moves than during the earlier study. They 1 are also likely to have had more confidence in the ability of their central bank to contain inflation. Finally, growing international integration has likely affected the Fed's influence on market rates. One indication noted by Rivera-Batiz, Rivera-Batiz (1993) : foreign exchange trading in New York has grown from $5 billion per day in 1977 to $50 billion a day in 1986 to $303 billion a day in 1992. Taken together, these factors make prediction of the Fed's impact on the pattern of market rates based on the results of the C&H study highly uncertain.
I find compelling evidence that substantially different regimes were in effect during this time period. First, the reaction by treasury security rates during 1985 -1987, a time corresponding to the tenure of Chairman Volcker, but also within a highly unstable international environment, were significantly attenuated compared to those during later periods. Reports of market activity in the Wall Street Journal, WSJ hereafter, suggest this was due to ambiguous signals emitted from the Federal Reserve. Further, I find evidence that Work by Bernanke and Mihov (1995) using econometric techniques to find that the Fed funds rate is an especially 2 good indicator of monetary policy after 1988 supports this decision. Goodfriend (1991) suggests the Fed switches at will between borrowed reserves and direct Fed funds targeting. 3 late in 1989 Chairman Greenspan dropped borrowed reserves targeting and resumed direct Fed funds targeting. According to official Fed records, the Fed began changing borrowed reserves targets very frequently, and they then exhibited a surprisingly substantial seasonal with annual frequency . This is 2 inconsistent with maintaining some desired level of borrowed reserves as was done earlier in the Greenspan tenure. The reaction in the term structure to the Fed's target rate changes during 1985-1992 thus depends not only on who is the chairman, but also his choice of operating procedures.
The corollary is that one must pay close attention to the sub-periods for reliable analysis. The whole sample results of the the weaker impact of the Fed on Treasury security rates is explained by examining the reactions across the regimes. The weakest response occurs during the time presided by Volcker which I attribute to either signalling, to expectations differences arising from differing activity within the periods or to bias in the estimates due to the Fed using bond rates as indicator variable. The latter Greenspan direct Fed funds targeting regime reactions are comparable in size and fit to the C&H results corresponding to an earlier direct Fed funds targeting regime. With respect to the term structure, I find that the average monthly interest rates implied by the expectations theory is consistent with the pattern of actual treasury rate reactions. For the borrowed reserves target regimes, I find the initially weaker reaction during the Volcker regime is offset by a strong reaction by 5 year rates to bring monthly rates near to the pre-policy shock rate over the 5-7 year horizon. The reversion to the pre-policy shock rate comes within a 7-10 year horizon under the first Greenspan regime. I also compare implied monthly interest rate after a policy shock between direct Fed funds rate regimes of the latter Greenspan regime and the [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] Fed. I find that after a policy easing, the market expects the monthly rate to remain at a lower level throughout a horzion of at least 20 years. This is consistent with expectations of a Fed that is able and willing to contain inflation: although it is easing, the public puts a lower expected value on inflation over the forseeable future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I first replicate the C&H study and find a weaker reaction for the period as a whole. Seeking to assign some cause for this lower influence of the Fed's direct 4 influence on market rates, I examine whether procedural differences within the central bank may have been responsible. An indication of a major difference in Fed policy between the studies is a Fed funds rate subject to much greater fluctuations. For 1975 -1979 , Rudebusch (1994 measures a standard deviation of .28 for the difference between the Fed funds rate and the target as opposed to . 43 during 1985-1992) . In the more recent period, the Fed states it regulates liquidity in the banking system by monitoring banks' borrowings at its window for discount loans rather than targeting the Fed funds rate directly. Goodfriend (1991) argues that this procedure makes the Fed funds rate more susceptible to fluctuations in the demand for reserves and so adds noise to the Fed's signals to the markets. Another new procedure, contemporaneous reserve accounting, is also frequently blamed for creating volatility in the Fed funds rate. On the other hand, differences observed in the reaction of market rates may be induced by events in the real economy, for example the stock market crash, the financing of great budget deficits, and payments imbalances from chronic trade deficits. In Part III, I investigate the reaction of treasury security rates in three distinct regimes, incorporating controls for the new operating procedures. In Part IV, I examine in greater detail whether market participants react in anticipation to the Fed or the Fed moves partly in response to the action in the Treasury markets. Then in Part V, I
summarize the findings for implications to the expectations theory and conclude.
II. Are The New Operating Procedures to Blame?
This study's ultimate goal is to measure the proximate impact of changes in the target Fed funds rate on the rates of different-maturity Treasury securities and thus on the term structure of interest rates. First, I
replicate as simply as possible the C&H results as a guide. I measure, on dates the Fed reported changing the target, the impact of these policy moves on treasury security rates of various maturities. Following this I examine in some detail the complications introduced by the Fed's current 'borrowed reserves' regime with 'contemporaneous reserve requirements' accounting.
II.A. Simple Replication of Cook and Hahn
(1)
In the earlier study, C&H examine the effect of perceived changes in the target Fed funds rate on treasury instruments' rates. C&H identify the perceived target changes using reports published in the "Credit Markets" column of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ hereafter) and emphasize a close correspondence of this measure to actual Fed target changes. In the 1985-1992 period, the Fed funds rate was very volatile so that market participants were often unable to perceive a change in the Fed's target Fed funds rate. Indeed, many target changes remained unnoticed by the WSJ reporters. This prevented me from following the C&H strategy, so I thus use official target changes as provided by the Federal Reserve Bank.
According to the expectations theory, the interest rates on long-and short-term treasury securities are set by market forces so that a hypothetical investor having a certain investment horizon will be indifferent to purchasing a long-term instrument that corresponds to her horizon and rolling a short-term instrument repeatedly over for the period. Extending this logic to overnight rates, the investor with a horizon of three months would consider rolling over overnight Fed funds for three months if she expected a return equal to that on a three-month security. Accordingly, a change in the Fed's targeted Fed funds rate, given a constant term premium, results in a new configuration of treasury security rates that implies the market's average expectation of the overnight rate for the next three months (and longer-term securities imply even further into the future) and indicates how long the market expects the Fed to support the new Fed funds rate level.
Assuming for the moment that the Fed funds rate target is exogenous (an issue I address in part IV), equation
(1) is the most direct measurement of the impact of a Fed funds rate target change on treasury market securities' rates. The first column of Table 1 gives results for the current sample period with C&H estimates provided as reference in the last column.
Clearly the coefficients estimated using daily data from 1985-1992 are about one-half the size of those estimated in the C&H study. The accuracy of the estimates has also diminished. Nevertheless, the basic pattern of the coefficients' magnitudes is similar to that of the C&H study: relatively large and accurate coefficients for the short-term rates decreasing in both dimensions as maturity increases. This suggests that One way that borrowed reserves may reflect real activity is if Fed monitors the characteristics of the banks 3 borrowing from the window. For example, Ho and Saunders (1985) model a Fed funds market in which risk-averse small banks always lend while large banks always borrow. If, counter to their usual behavior, small banks suddenly begin to request discount loans, the Fed may reasonably infer a serious negative reserve demand shock. See also empirical evidence by Allen, Peristiani, and Saunders (1989) and the discussion in Stigum (1990) .
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Fed policy changes have had a weaker, but similar effect on the term structure as that found by C&H for 1975-1979. One problem with this simple specification is that the coefficients are likely to be biased by the effects of the changed operating procedures. For example, changes in the targeted amount of borrowed reserves may also be an important determinant of rates in the Treasury securities markets. In the remainder of part II, I discuss the effects of important new operating procedures on Treasury security rates' reactions to policy shocks. Later in part IV, I examine whether one reason the influence of the Fed may have changed is that of greater anticipations by market participants.
II. B. Borrowed Reserves Targeting
In the standard description of the borrowed reserves operating regime (Goodfriend and Whelpley, 1986) , the Fed supplies an insufficient amount of reserves via open market operations for the banking system to meet its requirements. On net, this induces an excess demand for reserves on the Fed funds market, where those banks deficient in reserves borrow from others holding excess reserves, and some banks are then compelled to obtain reserves by borrowing from the Fed's discount window. Banks face a trade-off when they consider discount loans. The Fed strongly discourages banks from repeated borrowing, as described by the famous phrase: "borrowing is a privelege and not a right". On the other hand, banks have a pecuniary advantage in discount borrowing as the Fed funds rate is often higher than the discount rate. See Goldfeld and Kane's (1966) seminal work in modelling this relationship.
The idea behind "targeting" borrowed reserves is that the Fed wants to maintain that level of borrowed reserves associated with a desired rate of economic activity . And accordingly, the Fed will 3 undertake open market operations to adjust non-borrowed reserves to reattain that desired or target level of borrowed reserves if equilibrium had been upset by one shock or another. One advantage of borrowed This noise is also indicated by the high interest rates during this period. The maximum closing quote of the Fed 4 funds rate was 62.5% on December 26, 1990, a time when the market rates were much more modest. 7 reserves targeting from the Fed's perspective is to spread out over time the impact of policy changes (Goodfriend, 1991) . Yet it also permits the market Fed funds rate to drift further from the target than under a direct Fed funds target regime. If the Fed uses a direct target, policy makers can achieve very low dispersion of the market rate around the target rate.
A simple first attempt to trace the effect of borrowed reserves targeting scheme on the impact of Fed funds target changes on treasury security rates is to augment equation (1) with the independent variable recording the official changes in the borrowed reserves targets. This simple alteration of the model increases the coefficients on the target Fed funds rates by about 15%, at least for the short-term securities. The fit of the regressions on short-term securities also improves. I do not report the results in detail for the sake of brevity.
II.C. Contemporaneous Reserves Accounting
Since February, 1984, the Fed requires banks to maintain a level of reserves for their deposit liabilities over a concurrent biweekly period as contrasted to the previous system's calculation over a past weekly period. The requirement is calculated by averaging the bank's daily amounts of "reservable accounts"
(mainly time and demand deposits) for a ten-day "computation" period ending on a Monday which is then compared to the bank's average reserve holdings for a mostly-coincident ten-day "maintenance" period ending on the following Wednesday, the settlement date. Obviously, the description "contemporaneous" is something of a misnomer since compliance to the requirement is not enforced until after the end of the computation period. As banks must now estimate both their accounts and reserves with but two days to correct discrepancies, increased trading of Fed funds results, along with greater fluctuations in the market Fed funds rate (the standard deviation of the closing Fed funds rate is 5.16% on settlement days, vs. 1.92% otherwise ). Under this system then, banks are more likely to find themselves with unintended reserves or 4 may be forced to scramble for reserves due to unintended shortages. Indeed, recent research, e.g. Balducci,
It is important to use the first Thursday since market rates are returning to their normal levels on this date from 5 the either very high or very low rates of the final Wednesday. The attenuation of signals to the market present the Fed an additional policy instrument: for a subdued response to a Fed funds target change, the Fed can institute it on settlement dates. Interestingly, a large proportion of target changes occur on Thursdays.
I do not include discount rate changes separately in the analyses since they were usually made in concert with 6 Fed funds target changes (the four exceptions occurred very early in the sample). Further, when included in the final model, their coefficients differ insignificantly from zero.
The influence of inflation expectations might bias the response of treasury rates. I have run regressions including the price of gold futures, a derivative aimed to avoid capital losses on nominal instruments, to reduce omitted variable bias (although possibly introducing simultaneity bias). Since they do not influence materially the coefficients on Fed funds target changes, I do not report results.
8 Bertola, and Foresi (1993) and Hamilton (1996) , has shown the system to introduce biweekly seasonality in the Fed funds rate. Does this seasonality imposed on the Fed funds rate also have an impact on how changes in the Fed funds target affects treasury security rates? The signalling function of the Fed funds target rate could surely be weakened if target changes occur on settlement days, when the banks' last-minute adjustments to the new requirements are likely to interfere with the rate's signal to market participants. To measure this influence, I construct a dummy variable taking the value of one if a Fed policy change occurs on either the last Wednesday or the first Thursday of the reserve period . When interacted with the Fed funds target change, 5 the coefficients are highly significant, not only for the impact on Fed funds rates, but also for the treasury securities rates (see the second column of Table 1 ). I do not interpret the coefficients on the interacted term as any reaction of market rates to Fed policy change, but simply as a control for the settlement dates' noise. I therefore interpret the coefficient on the un-interacted independent variable as the treasury rate response on days other than the settlement dates. The preferred model will include both the variables controlling for contemporaneous reserves accounting and borrowed reserves targeting, to be described in the next part.
II. D. Responses for Entire 1985-1992 Period
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(2)
Controlling for settlement dates' effects and borrowed reserves target changes as motivated above, regressions of changes in various maturity treasury security rates on Fed funds target changes imply a similar, albeit weaker impact on the term structure as found by C&H (see results in second column of Table 1 ). Table 1 (second column) shows that short-term treasury securities' rates react in a signifiicantly negative way to a change in borrowed reserve targets. The standard model of the Fed funds market, Goodfriend and Whelpley (1986) cannot easily explain negative $ coefficients since it predicts the joint 2 determination of the Fed funds rate and the amount of borrowed reserves (given a discount rate). From a different perspective, however, it is sensible that an increase in borrowed reserves will increase the liquidity of the banking sector and thus decrease treasury security rates. Furthermore, given the data at my disposal (see figure 1 ), it does seem that the Fed determined borrowed reserves targets follow for most of the 1985-1992 period the actual amount of borrowed reserves.
Any event study must fulfill two conditions to measure an accurate reaction by e.g. treasury security rates to Fed funds rate target changes. First, a change in the Fed funds target rate must be accurately signalled to treasury market participants. Obviously, if noise or other interference prevents market participants from perceiving a target change, little of any response should be attributed to an expectations story. In this case, the only response by treasury security rates might be due to banks' treasury security sales motivated by a need to obtain reserves after e.g. a tightening. The second condition for an accurate measure is that the change in impulse, here the Fed funds rate target, must not be widely expected by market participants. Otherwise, market participants' anticipatory transactions are likely to bring the reaction before the impulse. On several occasions during this period, WSJ reported Fed signals of an imminent policy move prior to the official target change date. Discount rate changes, for example, sometimes preceded the corresponding Fed funds rate target change. Obviously in these cases, measuring the response on the target change date will ignore the part of the reaction prior to the official change.
For support, I regressed the change in the Tbill rates on the target change and borrowed reserves target change 7 for those episodes not reported in the WSJ and found near zero coefficients with a below zero adjusted R .
2 Surprisingly, "ideal" target changes were evenly distributed over the three regimes, 8 during Volcker, 5 during 8 Greenspan I and 8 during Greenspan II; the latter had the best proportion of target changes that were ideal, at 40%.
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For these reasons, one can question whether the results shown in the first two columns of Table 1 are free from bias due to the changes not being perceived by market participants. To test this, I assign a dummy variable the value one for those changes that were recognized and reported in the WSJ on the day subsequent to the target change. This should be an accurate measure of recognizance by the market: the WSJ reporters certainly had an interest in reporting changes in the targeted funds rate: they often discussed expected policy moves . I further assign another dummy variable to one if it was universally expected by market 7 participants. I followed the same conservative selection criterion as explained in greater detail in section IV below. Table 4 reports results from regressing various maturity treasury market secuities on Fed funds target changes when the two conditions are fulfilled. Unfortunately, only 21 observations remain out of 77, yet comparing Table 1 's second column with Table 4 shows that the reaction by a treasury security's rates to an average Fed funds target change differs little from an "ideal" target change. The greatest difference is seen in the reaction by 10 and 30 year securities which differ by .03 from the ideal . This should reassure that the 8 response on the same day as the target change does not differ substantially due to measurement error. Further analysis will be done in part IV to measure treasury securities reactions both before and after the target change date.
III. The Three Regimes of 1985-1992
The story as presented so far, however, is deceptive. Based on logic described below, I analyze the time period between 1985 and 1992 as consisting of three distinct sub-periods in which the Fed's policy impulse yielded substantially different reaction by treasury market securities' rates.
III.A. Borrowed Reserves and Fed Funds Targeting
One conjecture for the abandonment of borrowed reserves targeting is that the Fed wanted an instrument that 9 provided stronger signals to the market. Goodfriend (1991) gives as one of the advantages of borrowed reserves targeting that the Fed can avoid "news-making" policy, spreading the market reaction over several days. Perhaps the Fed changed to Fed funds targeting with the option of changing the target on settlement dates if it wants a "non-newsmaking" reaction (due to the high volatility of the Fed funds rate on these dates).
As can be seen from figure 1, the Fed funds -discount rate differential was historically very high during 1989 10 when the borrowed reserves target was running against the fitted seasonal.
Coefficients were significantly negative for the months of October and November for the whole sample and 11 positive for May during the Greenspan period.
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The borrowed reserve target scheme remains in use officially and has been taken seriously by several researchers, e.g. Leeper (1995 ) pg. 9, Roberds, et.al (1996 ), Strongin (1995 . Yet I find convincing evidence that the Fed has in fact abandoned borrowed reserves targeting to return to a direct Fed funds rate targeting regime . For one, the average time between borrowed reserve "target" changes has decreased from 80 9 business days during Volcker's regime to 14 during the latter period of Greenspan's regime. Figure 1 , plotting daily average borrowed reserves targets and the Fed funds target to discount differential over 1985-1992, shows that starting in late 1989, the Fed repeatedly changes borrowed reserves targets without corresponding changes in the differential. These frequent changes in borrowed reserves targets are more plausible if borrowed reserves were being used as indicator to support a Fed funds target rate. Figure 1 shows that the underlying pattern in borrowed reserves especially after 1989 is heavily influenced by a huge seasonal with annual frequency (the figure includes as orientation the fitted value of borrowed reserves resulting from a regression in daily levels of the borrowed reserves target on linear and quadratic trends with monthly dummies). The fitted policy relationship rises in the spring and summer and falls steeply in the fall and winter with exceptions in 1986 and early in 1989, when the Fed likely did maintain a borrowed reserves target . The tight coincidence of the two lines argues strongly against a spurious relation. Support is also 10 given by significant seasonal coefficients in a regression in differences of borrowed reserve targets on the 11 changes in the Fed funds to discount differential (and one lag) as well as the monthly dummies (Table 2) .
Further, autocorrelations (Figure 2) show the market Fed funds rate has adhered more closely to the target during the latter Greenspan regime. The market, as represented by the WSJ, certainly noted a difference:
reports mentioned fully 18 of the 20 target changes the following day during the latter Greenspan regime, a much greater proportion than the 16 of 28 in the Volcker period or the 12 of 29 during the Greenspan borrowed reserves target period. I continue the analysis suggested by these results in part III.D below.
III.B. The Fed and the Governors
Another explanation for the different market rate reactions during the C&H and present studies is suggested by the WSJ "Credit Markets" column which reported distinctive management styles by Greenspan and Volcker. It is surprising that a difference can arise in the impact of monetary policy since the chairmen share a strong dislike for inflation. As reported in the WSJ, market participants were unclear about the direction of policy during Volcker's time. One remark not atypical of others, cited near the end of Volcker's tenure: "There is a malaise in the market ... a sense that no one is in control and that the markets are being pushed and pulled by every development." (WSJ, April 24, 1987 have not yet discussed the dynamic impacts of policy, i.e. Volcker may have moved market rates prior to the target date. Finally, even if the market's reaction over several days is also weaker during Volcker's regime, it is inappropriate to use influence over market rates as a sufficient statistic for the chairman's effectiveness.
The surprisingly weaker response of the market Fed funds rate under Greenspan I vs. Volcker is explained in part 13 IV below: under Greenspan I, practically the entire response occurs on the two days prior to the official target change.
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In a very simple first attempt to ascertain the influence of the chairman on the impact of Fed policy, I
construct a dummy variable taking the value of one during Greenspan's time as chairman. I interact this variable with the change in the targeted Fed funds rate to use in a regression including the change in borrowed reserves target as above. Nearly all explanatory power during 1985-1992 arises during Greenspan's chairmanship . A more detailed set of results will be presented and discussed below. Table 3 (see also the third to fifth columns of Table 1 ).
There are stark differences between the regimes in the reaction of treasury market security rates. The smallest impact during the Volcker regime, a larger impact under the Greenspan I regime and finally, the strongest under the Greenspan II regime. This is not surprising. If markets did not receive strong signals from Volcker's Fed, any treasury rate reaction would be muted . Finally, the reaction in the Greenspan II
In the study C&H probe two days before and after the event and find that treasury security rates do not change 14 significantly prior to the event, although some short-term rates change after the event. Dale (1993) finds the Bank of England's policy moves induce large rate changes after the target change date.
14 regime is similar to that reaction measured by C&H, further support that the Fed again pursues a direct Fed funds target. I continue the analysis using the total sample and also provide estimates separately for the Volcker, Greenspan-I and Greenspan-II regimes. For reasons to be described in part IV.D below, I consider the Greenspan II results to be reliable estimates of the impact of a policy change on the term structure.
Estimates for Volcker and Greenspan I regimes will be reported in part IV.C below.
IV. Anticipation and Recognition
As discussed above, an anticipated target change may escape measurement since much of the impulse on the market may occur before the "event". After all, bond traders have high pecuniary incentives to anticipate Fed actions. A clever trader who infers an imminent Fed move to ease the Fed funds rate can, for example, purchase treasury bills to sell them later at a higher price once the Fed has implemented the lower rate. Event studies may also ignore reactions in the market if the price does not immediately attain an equilibrium level on the target change date. This recognition effect suggested by Goodfriend (1991) is especially likely during borrowed reserves target regimes since the Fed funds rate is not as clear a signal as during direct Fed funds target regimes . Event studies are also sensitive to the issue of exogeneity of the 14 independent variable. Later, I examine whether the changes in observed market rates are due to market participants' anticipations or the Fed reacting to changes in treasury rates. It may also be the case that both the Fed and markets follow a third impulse (e.g. indications of the state of the real economy).
There are also problems using estimations over several days to measure the impact. First, how
should the start date of the multiple date target change episode be determined? In theory, it should begin when the market begins to anticipate, obviously an unobservable variable. As discussed in more detail below, I find no systematic significant relationships of treasury rates and the target change prior to four days before
In a previous draft, I defined episodes to begin 5 days prior to the target change. The significant relationships 15 between long-term rates 5 days before the target change and the target changes, however, have since been found to be entirely due to reactions on 3 settlement dates in each of the three regimes. This casts considerable doubt on a robust relationsip between target changes and market rates in the 5 day horizon.
15 the target change, so I define the "event" to have a duration of 9 days, 4 days prior to and 4 days after the target change .
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To isolate changes in market rates that arise due to anticipations of a Fed move, I define a qualitative variable that indicates days on which the WSJ reported market participants had formed a consensus on a projected Fed funds target change. This is important since whether the Fed is exogenous or not is contentious. Some researchers, for example Dale (1990) , suggest the central bank may be influenced by market rates prior to a policy change. This is an argument that the Fed is endogenous to make suspect any inferences about the Fed's influence on market rates. Alternatively, Goodfriend ( A final problem in using estimations over several days is that once the market anticipates that the Fed is to change its targeted Fed funds rate, the changes engendered in the term structure induce other reactions in the economy. This final problem may be considered as serious as time aggregation of weekly or monthly data. Given the market's volatile reaction to news, the average 9 day episode may be interpreted as the time required for the market to converge to a new configuration of rates following the target change.
In the remainder of part IV, I report measurements of changes in treasury security rates several days prior and subsequent to changes in the targeted Fed funds rate. After describing the rationale for using a 9- Results of the cumulative regressions using the whole sample of 44 observations (third sub-column of each maturity in Table 5 ) confirm at least crudely the basic pattern found by C&H: short term rates react most strongly with a diminishing reaction by longer-term rates. In detail, however, there are interesting differences. The strongest reaction is by 3 and 6 month securities while the 1 and 3 year maturities react less (although the 3 year securities react strongly relative to the time studied by Cook and Hahn).
Interesting patterns are observed prior to the target changes (see Table 5 ). Significant reactions are measured in long-term rates on days T -4 and T -1 (in fact, the long-term bond reactions are stronger before the target date). Short-term rates' reactions prior to the target change date are more evenly distributed, e.g. the 6 month T-bill reacts significantly on each day prior to the target change. Further, the 3 year bond rate is apparently reacting similarly to both long-and short-term rates. On the day of the target change, the 3-year rate rises as much as short-term rates, yet longer-term rates do not react at all. On day T -3 too, the 3-year bond reaction was closer to that of shorter-term rates than to longer-term rates. More insight into these anomalies can be gained by separating the sample into regimes discussed in part III. This will be done in part IV.C below. First, however, I address whether the Fed reacts to market rates to imply that anticipations are not responsible for the significant relationships in treasury security rates prior to the target change.
The effects on treasury markets of speculators seeking to exploit expected Fed changes are well-known. One 16 analyst illustrates clearly: "The market clearly is expecting a discount rate cut. If it doesn't happen, you can expect short-term rates to bounce back up. The market is already priced for a discount rate cut." (WSJ, May 17, 1985) Cook and Hahn (1988) use a similar strategy to classify discount rate announcements as either leading or Table 6 shows that on average, market participants significantly anticipate the Fed's policy move only two
During Greenspan II, the interaction term and target change are subject to high multicollinearity, (e.g. the 18 correlation of the Fed funds target change and the interaction term was over .90 on day T -1). Based on this strong relationship, I attribute to anticipations the treasury rates' responses on days before the target change.
Separate regressions on day T -4 observations during the Greenspan I regime gave target change yielded 19 very poor fit indeed, all adjusted R were less than zero.
2 18 days before the actual target change. Several significant $ coefficients on days T -3 and T -4 raise doubts 1 about the Fed's exogeneity. Further insight will be given below.
IV.C. Borrowed Reserves: Volcker or Greenspan?
The questions posed by the whole sample results in Table 6 beg for explanation. I thus examine the sample differentiating the Volcker and Greenspan I borrowed reserves regimes using interaction terms. I seek to find which regime or both is responsible for the day T -4 reaction that was not, according to The results show (see Table 7 ) that the day T -4 reaction by long-term rates occurred only during the Volcker regime . In fact, the first rate reactions prior to the target date during Greenspan I occurred on day T
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-2, the same day there were significant anticipations as shown in Table 6 . This may suggest to some that the Volcker Fed used long-term interest rates as indicator of real activity regularly 4 days prior to the actual target date. It is also consistent, however, with the market moving by anticipations: perhaps the qualitative variable I construct is simply too conservative. More credence for this argument is gained when we recall that Volcker did not encourage (an understatement) the market to form homogeneous expectations about the Fed's likely tactics. Accordingly, analysts anticipated the Fed moves, but there was no consensus in the market and this obscured the WSJ reporters perception.
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IV.D. Implications for the Expectations Theory
I find that borrowed reserves target changes bring such weak same-day treasury responses that they implausibly represent the entire change in treasury security rates to Fed policy changes. I thus interpret the cumulative nine-day response (table 7) as the impact on the term structure during these regimes. This is consistent with Goodfriend's (1991) characterization of this regime as spreading out a policy move's impact over several days. On the other hand, I use the same-day responses (table 1) to measure the impact on the term structure during the direct Fed funds rate target regime (Greenspan II). I justify this choice on several grounds. First, the market recognized (as reported in WSJ) the response in 18 of the 20 episodes. Second, the Fed funds rate reaction was very strong (Table 1) . And finally, the reactions are comparable in magnitude to those found by C&H during the 1975-1979 direct Fed funds target regime (Table 1) .
I compare borrowed reserves regimes (Volcker and Greenspan I) and the direct Fed funds rate regimes (Greenspan II to 1975 -1979 to gain intuition of the implications of the results to the expectations theory. I thus construct an average monthly implied interest rate suggested by the constant term premium version of the expectations theory. Roughly, the lowest maturity reaction suggests an average monthly rate over its horizon. The next higher maturity reaction encompasses the earlier average, thus implying a monthly average for the horizon between the last month covered by the shorter reaction and the last month of its own horizon. Since the gap between maturities is up to twenty years (in the case of the longest maturity tested), the average gives a more intuitive view than by simply looking at the reaction itself.
An example should clarify this procedure. The Greenspan II reaction of the 3 month and 6 month treasury securities were .46 and .49 respectively. First I assume that the monthly average rate over months t+0, t+1, and t+2 is .46. Using the estimated 6 month reaction and the expectations theory gives us the average monthly rates for months t+3, t+4, and t+5. That is, nominal interest rates to increase more under Greenspan I for the horizon to three years out. Later, however, it seems that the public expected Volcker's Fed to be more able to return short run rates to the pre-policy level. The average level over the above-10-year horizon during Greenspan I was approximately three times higher than during Volcker.
I compare direct Fed funds target change under Greenspan II to the time studied by C&H. This is interesting because, prior to the great Volcker switch to non-borrowed reserves targeting in 1979, the market had little confidence in the central bank's ability to restrain inflation. I will compare easings in this circumstance since Greenspan II policy moves were only of this type. In this case, however, a conservative central banker such as Greenspan would be understood not to be prone to ease excessively and we can thus hypothesize that the market would expect inflation not to be excited by a central bank under such a chairman.
In this case, inflation expectations over the long run would be lower than in the earlier direct Fed funds rate regime. And thus the reaction in long run rates should be greater. According to figure 4, this is exactly what I find. Starting at the 12 month horizon, short-term rates are expected to be lower under Greenspan II than during the time studied by C&H. Despite the similarity in average monthly rates implied by the short-term reactions, there is a consistent and large gap between the Feds over the longer horizon.
V. Conclusion
First, I find a large amount of seasonality in borrowed reserves targets at an annual frequency, which corresponds to an agricultural cycle, rising in the spring and declining in the autumn. This leads to suspect that the Fed no longer "defends" a target for borrowed reserves, but follows the demand for reserves incorporated in this seasonal cycle. This is a partial basis for concluding that the Fed has actually, if not officially, abandoned borrowed reserves targeting and now uses a direct Fed funds rate to aim for noninflationary growth. The conclusion is supported by a closer adhesion of the Fed funds rate to the target and larger same-day responses to target changes (similar indeed in size to a previous direct Fed funds target regime). That the Fed again uses direct Fed funds targeting is likely a reason that the Fed funds rate is again an excellent indicator of Fed policy, as found by Bernanke and Mihov (1995) .
Paying close attention to the sub-periods shows that the weaker market reaction to the Fed using the whole sample is explained by differences in each regimes. The weakest response occurs during the time presided by Volcker which I attribute to either signalling (Volcker's style was to emit no clear signals to the market so expectations were "heterogenous" while Greenspan's market leadership forged more "homogeneous" expectations), to expectations differences arising from differing activity within the periods or to bias in the estimates due to the Fed using bond rates as indicator variable. The latter Greenspan direct Fed funds targeting regime reactions are comparable in size and fit to the C&H results corresponding to an earlier direct Fed funds targeting regime. With respect to the term structure, I find that the average monthly interest rates implied by the expectations theory is consistent with the pattern of actual treasury rate reactions. For the borrowed reserves target regimes, I find the initially weaker reaction during the Volcker regime is offset by a strong reaction by 5 year rates to bring monthly rates near to the pre-policy shock rate over the 5-7 year horizon. The reversion to the pre-policy shock rate comes within a 7-10 year horizon under the first
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Greenspan regime. I also compare implied monthly interest rate after a policy shock between direct Fed funds rate regimes of the latter Greenspan regime and the 1975-1979 Fed. I find that after a policy easing, the market expects the monthly rate to remain at a lower level throughout a horzion of at least 20 years. This is consistent with expectations of a Fed that is able and willing to contain inflation: although it is easing, the public puts a lower expected value on inflation over the forseeable future.
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Appendix 1: Anticipations of Fed Target Changes in Specific Episodes
This appendix gives examples of language in the "Credit Markets" column of the WSJ to illustrate the logic for categorizing whether each date within the 44 episodes (1985 -1992) was subject to a unanimous expectation of a target change. Dates reported in the WSJ are those appearing in print the day following the day given in the second column. Since I use the WSJ to uncover whether the market was anticipating the Fed or the Fed was responding to the long-term interest rates, I omit days subsequent to the target change; i.e. the target change date is the final date listed in the 2nd column of the table.
EpiDate Fed Ant Wall Street Journal sode Move Fed "Credit Markets" description of episode 1 Jan.17 -24, Tight 0 Government reports indicated lower inflation. On Jan. 18: "Fed will stick to easy 1985 money policy for the next few weeks". On Jan. 23 (the day before the target change) "investors are beginning to believe inflation will stay at low levels". example, "pressure on Fed intense to cut rate if Germany and Japan cut." was followed by "... but others disagree". The Mar. 6 headline was "Bond prices rise on wide expectations of cut in discount rate". 6 May 16 -22, Tight 0 The concern apparent in the WSJ was on likely inflation from oil price increases. 1986 On May 19, was reported "oil price increase cuts optimism about inflation and strengthens argument that Fed won't ease". However, oil prices eased and "dollar played an increasingly influential role".
7
May 30 -Tight 0 On June 3, Treasury secretary Baker announced that there was "room for further Jun. 5, 1986 decline in rates", but this did not result in a widely expected Fed move.
8 Jul. 7 -11, Ease 1 On July 8, "speculation that Fed will lower discount rate has swept through market 1986 for weeks leading many investment managers to contend that bond prices already reflect such a move". The discount rate change was announced a day before it became effective. 9 Nov. 28 -Tight 0 The Fed's tightening move was clearly unanticipated since the headline on Dec. 3 Dec. 4, 1986 was "Bond Prices rise as belief grows Fed will ease in coming months" 21 Oct. 14 -20, Tight 0 WSJ did not note any widespread anticipation of policy move by Fed. 1988 22 Dec. 9 -15, Tight 1 For Dec. 9, the headline indicated that the market already believed that the Fed was 1988 tightening: "Fed seems to have tightened policy slightly..." (this is 4 days before the actual policy change).
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Apr. 28 -Tight 0 Inflation was problem leading up to the Fed change, but abated with lower oil May 4, 1989 prices and more favorable government reports. On May 3 it was reported that the "beige book" released by Fed indicated that "inflationary pressures may be easing" and this increased the likelihood of Fed keeping the target steady. 
27
Aug. 4 -10, Ease 0 Anticipations in this episode were set by an unexpectedly strong employment report 1989 and "speculation that the Fed had paused in its march toward lower interest rates". This appeared for Aug. 4. News in the remainder of the episode centered on the treasury's bond sales.
28 Oct. 12 -18, Ease 1 Anticipations were aroused early this episode. On Oct. 12, the headline: "Treasury 1989 Bonds rise modestly on speculation that Fed is letting rates ease slightly". Problems in the junk bond and stock markets influenced trading in the bond markets.
29
Oct. 31 -Ease 0 Oct. 31: A sharper than expected fall in sales of single-family homes aroused the Nov. 6, 1989 anticipation of the market to the hope that the Fed would cut rates. This was not universal, however, and the market was described as waiting for the results of the difficult-to-predict employment report.
30 Dec. 14 -20, Ease 0 Junk bonds were in trouble, but the Fed did not act to ease credit conditions at the 1989 convenience of the traders. Dec. 18: "Many are sniping at the Fed for failing to cut rates". And: "Although there are widespread expectations that the Fed will eventually ease credit conditions further, uncertainty about the timing of the move is keeping many investors out of the market." 31 July 9 -13, Ease 0 There was little anticipation by market participants during this episode until July 1990 12 (the day before the target change) when Greenspan "surprised the bond market ... to ease credit conditions". the headline "Bond prices move higher as expectations grow that Fed will cut rates soon to spur economy". There followed a discussion about whether the Fed had already eased (it hadn't). However, the next day, it was noted "Economists don't believe ..a sign that the Fed is easing".
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June 26 -Ease 1 A heavily anticipated episode. Many economic indicators signalled a slowing July 2, 1992 economy which analysts believed would campel the Fed to ease credit conditions. On June 29, headline "Bill rates at auction decline to 20 year lows as sentiment grows that Fed will ease credit". and June 30 headline "...speculation continues over likelihood of Fed rate cut".
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Aug. 31 -Ease 0 This was an episode which had very light activity reported since bond market Sept 4, 1992 participants were waiting for results from the employment report. The dummy variable, anticipation of Fed target change, is assigned the value of 1 if the Wall Street Journal indicated the market was unanimously expecting the Fed to move. Although each individual day has its own value for the variable in the data, the third column in the above table summarizes each episode. So, for example, when only one day of the episode was affected by inflation, the column is marked 0, but for that day the dummy variable is assigned the value of 1. Constants were included in the estimations, but were economically small and significant only in two cases (the 30 bond rate during Greenspan I and the Fed funds rate for the entire sample). I also allowed for changes in First Thursday intercepts which were only significant for the long-term bonds in the Greenspan II regime. The tstatistics in parentheses are calculated using errors corrected for heteroskedacity according to White or Huber. All regressions included constants which were insignificantly different from 0 and also linear and quadratic trend terms which were significant only at the time of Volcker. *, ** denote significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. R 2 The model also included constants, and allowed for changing intercepts in each regression. They were in all cases insignificantly different from 0. *, ** represent significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. .06 -.10
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.29** Regressions included the cumulative change in borrowing targets and also first Thursday dummy variables for each day. The cumulative columns are obtained from separate regressions includ ing the cumulative borrowing targets and thus may differ slightly from the sums of the individual regression on preceding days. *, ** represent .01 and .05 levels respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. These regressions included cumulative borrowing targets, constants and allowed for different borrowing target constants under both regimes. *, ** represent 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively.
